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PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK: HOW TO PROTECT VIRTUAL 
PORNOGRAPHERS AND ACTUAL CHILDREN ON THE INTERNET 
ITH its ruling in Ashcrop v. Free Speech Coalition,' the Supreme Court 
cloaked virtual child pornography with First Amendment protec- W 
t i ~ n . ~  In so doing, it rejected all of the government's contentions con- 
cerning the harm to actual children that virtual pornography may 
engender.3 In particular, the Court rejected the government's position 
that a ban o n  virtual pornography is necessary because of the difficulty of 
establishing that an image depicted an  actual, rather than a virtual child.4 
Instead, the Court suggested that creating a market for virtual pornogra- 
phy is not only innocuous to actual children, but could actually protect 
them.5 
This Article considers the Supreme Court's suggestion and recom- 
mends a mechanism to regulate the virtual pornography market in a man- 
ner that balances the rights of virtual pornographers with the prosecution 
of actual child pornographers. Part I1 traces the events leading u p  to the 
Free Speech decision, commencing with the enactment of the Child Pornog- 
raphy Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA).6 Part I11 discusses the Free Speech 
opinion and the post-Free Speech cases.' Part IV examines the PROTECT 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.S., 1977, State 
University of New York at Albany; J.D., 1980, St. John's University School of Law. 
1. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
2. See id. at 258 (discussing holding in context of plausible First Amendment 
violations that may arise with broadly written language). 
3. See id. at 236 ("While the Government asserts that the images can lead to 
actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect."). A b  
sent causation, the government maintained that child pornography rests outside 
the First Amendment's protection because the government did not consider por- 
nographic images to be valuable speech. See id. (recounting government's argu- 
ments for why Court should uphold law). The Court, however, considered the 
government's categorization of child pornography as incongruent with previous 
holdings. See id. (highlighting government's misapplication of holding in New Yurk 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)). 
4. See id. at 254 (describing government's argument as "implausible"). 
5. See id. (reasoning that few pornographers would illegally abuse actual chil- 
dren if virtual images would suff~ciently feed an interested market). 
6. 18 U.S.C. 55 2251-2260 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). For a discussion of the 
events leading up to the Free Speech ruling commencing with the enactment of the 
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), see infia notes 11-20 and ac- 
companying text. 
7. For a discussion of the Free Speech case and post-Free Speech cases, see infra 
notes 21-80 and accompanying text. 
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Acts-the legislative response to the Supreme Court's dec i~ ion .~  Part V 
concludes that regulation of the virtual pornography industry is the most 
effective method of protecting children and free speech rights.1° Building 
upon existing statutory record-keeping provisions and adapting them to 
virtual pornography can best accomplish such regulation. 
Congress brought the issue of virtual pornography to the forefront 
with its enactment of the CPPA.ll Seeking to be proactive, Congress's ban 
on pornographic images of virtual children was based on congressional 
findings of a compelling state interest in protecting actual children from 
all child pornography, whether it depicted real or virtual children.12 The 
legislative history of the CPPA was premised on thirteen findings, includ- 
ing that pedophiles use images of child pornography to seduce actual chil- 
dren by reducing their inhibitions and desensitizing them to sexual 
conduct.13 Congress found that both real and virtual child pornography 
8. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Chil- 
dren Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), 18 U.S.C. fj 2252A (2000 & Supp. 111 2003). 
For further discussion, see infia notes 81-100 and accompanying text. 
9. For a discussion of the PROTECT Act, see infia notes 101-08 and accompa- 
nying text. 
10. For a discussion of suggestions for regulating virtual pornography, see in- 
p a  notes 109-66 and accompanying text. 
11. "Before 1996, Congress defined child pornography as the type of depic- 
tions at issue in Ferber, images made using actual minors." Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002). Congress first passed legislation concerning 
child pornography with the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95225, 92 Stat. 7 (1977) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2251-2253 (1978)). This Act focused on child pornography that was obscene 
and commercially produced. See id. (discussing purpose of Act). The Supreme 
Court's 1982 ruling in New Ymk v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), banning all pornog- 
raphy using actual children regardless of whether it was obscene, helped lead to 
the next chapter in the legislative attempts to ban child pornography-the Child 
Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1984)), and the Child Sexual Abuse and 
Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628 § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 (1986)). See generally John P. Feldmeier, Close 
Enough for Government Wmk: An Examination of Congressional E f f i  to Reduce the Gov- 
ernment's Burden of Proof in Child Pornography Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205 (2003) 
(tracing historically relevant congressional responses to federal common law in 
light of expanding criminality of child pornography). 
In 1986 the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography issued its final 
report, which examined the problems with the existing child pornography legisla- 
tion and suggested changes in the law to better protect children. See generally 
UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, A~T'Y GEN. COMM. ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REP. 
(1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The report led to the enactment of the Child 
Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 
4181 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251A-2252 (1988)). 
12. See CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT. OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104358, at 
2 (1996). 
13. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104208, 110 Stat. 
3009 (1996). 
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whets the appetite of molesters by fueling their fantasies and  stimulating 
their desire to molest an actual child.14 Moreover, Congress determined 
that child pornography prosecutions would be increasingly difficult as 
images of virtual children become indistinguishable from actual victims of 
child pornography.15 Specifically, Congress found that "new photo- 
graphic and computer imaging technologies, make it possible to produce 
by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual depictions of what ap- 
pear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtually 
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer" from images of actual 
children.16 
In recognition of the advances being made in technology and the In- 
ternet, the CPPA expanded the definition of child pornography to encom- 
pass "any visual depiction" that "is m appears to be, a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct."" The CPPA contained an affirmative defense 
allowing the producers of pornography to establish that the pornography 
was produced using adults.18 The ban on virtual pornography created a 
wealth of commentarylg and a split between the circuitsz0 that was ulti- 
mately resolved by the United States Supreme Court. 
14. See CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104358, at 
2. 
15. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting CPPA defini- 
tion of criminal exploitation of children also includes youthful-looking adult 
actors). 
16. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104358, at 2 
(reporting relative ease with which sexual abuse of children can occur with increas- 
ingly powerful technological advances). See also Samantha L. Friel, Porn by Any 
Other Name? A Constitutional Alternative to Regulating "Victimless" Computer Generated 
Pornography, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 223 (1997) (presenting example of how com- 
puter programmer could splice child's image with adult's image to create porno- 
graphic picture without real child participation). 
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added). 
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (discussing CPPA's affirma- 
tive defense). 
19. See generally Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amadmat ,  149 U. PA. L. REV. 921 
(2001) (discussing child pornography and its effect on First Amendment analysis); 
Daniel S. Armaugh, The Fate of the Child Pornography Act of 1996: Virtual Child Pornog- 
raphy: Criminal Conduct or Protected Speech, 23 CvlDozo L. REV 1993 (2002) (finding 
causal link between visual depictions of sexual conduct and emotional and physical 
damage to both depicted and nondepicted children); Debra D. Burke, The 
Criminaliration of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 h v .  J .  ON 
LEGIS. 439 (1997) (discussing whether child pornography is protected speech); 
Friel, supra note 16, (proposing rebuttable presumption that image depicting child 
in sexual activity is child pornography whether child is virtual or actual); Belinda 
Tiosavljevic, A Field Day for Child Pornographers and Pedophiles if the Ninth Circuit Gets 
Its Way: Striking down the Constitutional and Necessary Child Pornography Prevention Act 
of 1996, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 545 (2001) (discussing CPPA and Ninth Circuit's deci- 
sion in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)); Matthew K 
Wegner, Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Why Traditional Free Speech Doctrine Suppmts 
Anti-ChiId-Pornography Regulations in Virtual Reality, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2081 (2001) 
(arguing that national obscenity standard regulates virtual child pornography). 
20. Four Circuits upheld the CPPA. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 
411 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction of defendant who knowingly 
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A. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Free Speech and, in 
a 6 3  decision, struck down the CPPA's ban on pornography using virtual 
children, ruling that the CPPA's "appears to be" language was overbroad 
and unconstitutional under the First The majority opin- 
ion written by Justice Kennedy stated that the harm to actual children, 
which is the premise of the ban on child pornography, is missing when a 
virtual child is depicted.22 Moreover, in rejecting the government's argu- 
ment, the Court reasoned that the possibility that virtual pornography 
might whet the appetite of child molesters was too remote to support an 
abridgement of constitutionally protected speech.23 
The majority also rejected the government's position that the CPPA 
serves to eliminate the market for actual child p ~ r n o g r a p h y . ~ ~  In contrast, 
the Court stressed the reverse-that allowing virtual pornography could in 
fact protect children by drying up the market of actual child pornography. 
"If virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal 
images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substi- 
tutes. Few pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing actual chil- 
dren if fictional, computerized images would suffice."25 The Court also 
rejected the government's claim that, with advances in computer technol- 
ogy, it will be increasingly difficult to distinguish between actual and vir- 
downloaded and transmitted pornographic images of children from computer at 
place of employment), vacated by, Fox v. U.S., 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); United States 
v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that "appears to be" 
language of CPPA remains constitutionally welldefined to substantiate conviction 
of defendant), vacated by, Mento v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); United 
States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650-53 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing defendant's 
failure to prove CPPA language is sufficiently vague or overbroad); United States v. 
Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1999) (reasoning that CPPA falls outside con- 
stitutionally-protected speech and that CPPA's definition of child pornography is 
"adequately precise."). The Ninth Circuit found the CPPA to be invalid on its face. 
See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that CPPA language violates First Amendment because of insufficient compelling 
government interest). 
21. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (d' ISCUSS- 
ing holding). 
22. See id. at 250-52 (discussing Court's reasoning). 
23. See id. at 253-54 ("First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when 
the government seeks to control thought or to j u s q  its laws for that impermissible 
end."). 
24. See id. at 254 (rejecting government's argument as "implausiblen due to 
government's false assumption that virtual images would incentivize criminal 
activity ) . 
25. Id. 
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tual p o r n ~ g r a p h y . ~ ~  It stressed that protected speech cannot be limited as 
a means of suppressing unlawful speech.27 
In addition, the majority noted that the CPPA's affirmative defense, 
which shifts from the government the burden of proving an image de- 
picted only adults, only applied to producers and distributors of pornogra- 
phy and left possessors of pornography ~ n p r o t e c t e d . ~ ~  Moreover, the 
affirmative defense did not protect individuals who created pornographic 
images solely by computer; resulting in a complete ban on virtual 
p o r n ~ g r a p h y . ~ ~  
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed 
that the "appears to be" language in the CPPA was overbroad because it 
could be used to infringe on images of youthful looking adults, but she 
would have upheld the ban on virtual child pornography that is "virtually 
indistinguishable fromn actual child p ~ r n o g r a p h y . ~ ~  Rejecting the crux of 
the majority's rationale, Justice O'Connor found that virtual pornography 
whets the appetite of molesters who may then use the virtual images to 
seduce young children.31 Moreover, Justice O'Connor stressed the "seri- 
ous concernn that actual child pornographers may evade prosecution by 
claiming that an image was computer-generated.32 She agreed with the 
majority that the "language was not narrowly tailored," and suggested the 
"virtually indistinguishable from" language would better keep with the lan- 
guage used in the legislative findings.33 Similarly, in his concurring opin- 
ion, Justice Thomas noted that should technology reach the point that the 
government is unable to distinguish an image of actual from virtual por- 
nography-and therefore unable to prosecute-regulation of the latter 
would be permissible, perhaps with an affirmative defense that would meet 
the majority's concerns.34 
26. See id. at 254-55 (reasoning that First Amendment forbids criminalization 
of constitutionally protected speech because of "mere resemblance" to unpro- 
tected speech). 
27. See id. (discussing scope of First Amendment protection). 
28. See id. at 255 (discussing evidentiary difficulties of affirmative defense). 
29. See id. at 255-56 (highlighting insufficiencies of affirmative defense where 
defendants can prove they did not harm children through image production). 
30. See id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concumng) (stressing danger in distribu- 
tion of virtual images). 
31. See id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's 
holding). Justice O'Connor heavily relies on the congressional findings that corre- 
late virtual images to sexual predation of children. See id. (O'Connor, J., concur- 
ring) (citing congressional findings of CPPA). 
32. See id. (O'Connor, J., concumng) (equating available defense with "rea- 
sonable" means through which criminal could circumvent culpability). Justice 
O'Connor's argument focuses on the reasonable probability of sexual predators 
evading accountability for molestation through increasingly sophisticated technol- 
ogy. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (assuming that criminal behavior will go 
unpunished due to eventually successful defense). 
33. Id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
34. See id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Justice Thomas's 
concern for evolution of technology). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed with Justice 
O'Connor that the government had a compelling interest in protecting 
children from the harm of sexual abuse, and that technological advances 
will soon make it nearly impossible for the government to protect children 
from sexual abuse.35 The Chief Justice found that the CPPA could have 
been interpreted to reach only what was previously unprotected speech.36 
According to the Chief Justice, the CPPA would only ban hardcore por- 
nography involving actual sexual activity between youthful looking adult 
actors, not mere suggestions of sexual activity that are advertised or pro- 
moted as child porr~ography.~' Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted that Congress intended for the CPPA only to reach those computer- 
generated images that are easily mistaken for pictures of actual children 
engaging in sexual conduct.38 The CPPA proscribed images that were vir- 
tually indistinguishable from pictures of actual children, not depictions of 
Shakespearian tragedies, as the majority purported.3g 
B. Post-Free Speech Cases 
Since the 2002 Free Speech ruling, the government's fears of difficulty 
in prosecuting purveyors of child pornography have been, in great mea- 
sure, borne out. First, a number of defendants who were convicted under 
pre-Free Speech jury instructions that defined child pornography as includ- 
ing images that "appear to be" minors have had their convictions over- 
35. See id. at 267-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Turner Broadcast- 
ing Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)). 
36. See id. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982) finding CPPA could be interpreted to only ban "hard core 
of child pornographyn). 
37. See id. at 269-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same). 
38. See id. at 270-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing CPPA's legisla- 
tive history and congressional intent behind Act). 
39. See id. at 270 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority opin- 
ion). In addition, the Chief Justice noted that actual movie producers never felt 
the chill of protected speech that the majority claimed would occur from the CPPA 
as evidenced by the Best Picture Oscars garnered by the films noted by the major- 
ity. See id. at 272 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting Best Picture nominations for 
"American Beauty" and "Traffic"). Finally, according to the Chief Justice, the 
CPPA's prohibition on advertising and promoting did not reach any further than 
the "sordid business of pandering" that was already unprotected by the First 
Amendment. Id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Ginzberg v. United 
States, 383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966)). The majority read this provision too broadly, 
according to the Chief Justice, because it would not reach a person who possesses 
protected materials. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Agreeing with Justice 
O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the provision could be constitu- 
tionally limited by requiring that a possessor know the material contains images of 
real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct or virtually indistinguishable com- 
puter-generated images. See id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (offering alter- 
native interpretation of CPPA). 
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turned and have received acquittals40 or new trials.41 Thus, in United States 
v. E l l y ~ o n , ~ *  the Fourth Circuit held that the government was required to 
prove that the images found on the defendant's computer were of actual 
children, and the jury instructions could have led the jury to convict for 
possession of constitutionally protected  material^.^^ In finding that retrial 
rather than acquittal was appr0priate,4~ the Fourth Circuit acknowledged 
that there "is no suggestion whatsoever that . . . the images are computer 
generated."45 Nevertheless, the court found the jury instructions to be 
erroneous based on the government's expert witness who testified that it is 
possible to "completely construct an image of a young boy* by computer 
t e ~ h n o l o g y . ~ ~  The court noted that because the images were not included 
in the appellate record, they were unable to make their own assessment of 
the authenticity of the images.47 As will be discussed below, the admission 
of the pictures into evidence had tactical s igni f ican~e.~~ 
Second, as Justice O'Connor predicted, defendants have moved 
to have indictments dismissed or convictions overturned because of 
the government's failure to prove that they "knowinglyn possessed 
actual child p ~ r n o g r a p h y . ~ ~  For example, in United States u. 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1228 (D.N.M. 2002) 
(acquitting defendant on one of four counts relating to receipt of pornographic 
images because of government's failure to satisfy their burden of production). 
41. See United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522,530 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting new 
trials granted in some cases due to jury instructions based on "appears to ben lan- 
guage); United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1063 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); 
United States v. Hilton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4208, *19-20 (D. Me. March 20, 
2003) (same). 
42. 326 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2003). 
43. See id. at 522. 
44. See id. at 535. Defendant argued that he should receive a judgment of 
acquittal on the grounds of insufficient evidence of shipment of child pornogra- 
phy across state lines. See id. (outlining defendant's argument for acquittal). 
45. See id. at 535 (citing Richardson, 304 F.3d at 1064). 
46. Id. at 531. 
47. See id. (highlighting court's inability to assess authenticity of pictures). In 
contrast, in Richardson, a new trial was avoided by appellate review of the images 
that demonstrated they were of actual children. See Richardson, 304 F.3d at 1061. 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 255 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (noting significance of "quantity, nature, and organization of the child por- 
nography" to appellate record). For a further discussion of the Pabon-Cruz case, 
see inpa notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004) (demon- 
strating situation where defendant moved for dismissal or acquittal); United States 
v. Tanner, 66 Fed. Appx. 449 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Hall, 312 
F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Richardson, 304 F.3d at 1061 (same); Pabon- 
Crur, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (same); United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222 
(D.N.M. 2002) (same); United States v. Dean, 231 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D. Me. 2002) 
(same); United States v. Oakes, 224 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D. Me. 2002) (same); Tad 
Dickens, Guilty Plea in Child Porn Case May be Altered; Man Asks Roanoke Judge to Let 
Him Withdraw Plea, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, July 8, 2002, at C1 (noting 
impact of Free Speech case on child pornography prosecution), avaikbk at 2002 WL 
24045079. 
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Rei lZ~ ,~~  the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea of receiving child 
pornography on the grounds that the allocution was insufficient because it 
did not state that the defendant knew the images he received were of ac- 
tual minors.51 The court granted the motion in light of the Free Speech 
ruling.52 The court melded the Supreme Court's earlier opinion in United 
States v. X-citement Video:3 which mandated that the government prove that 
a defendant "knowingly" possess a visual depiction of a minor, with the Free 
Speech protection of virtual p ~ r n o g r a p h y . ~ ~  Thus, not only must the gov- 
ernment prove that an image is of an actual child, it must prove that the 
defendant knew it was not of a virtual Defendants have seized on 
the CPPA and its legislative findings to argue that they had no way of 
knowing whether an image was virtual or actual, and therefore, the gov- 
ernment failed to establish the requisite mens  re^.^^ 
In contrast to the Reilly decision, one federal district court refused to 
allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in a post-Free Speech case in 
which the defendant asserted he could not "know" the image was of an 
actual The court reasoned that the defendant was aware of the 
government's burden, yet voluntarily pled guilty-in United States v. Mar- 
c ~ . ~ ~  Nevertheless, in dicta that proved to be portentous of future cases, 
the court noted: 
[A]n individual who simply possesses or receives images of chil- 
dren engaged in sexually explicit conduct may not even consider, 
much less know, whether the images depict actual children or 
are the product of computer technology; indeed, such nuances 
as to origin seemingly would be irrelevant to the viewer if the two 
50. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19564 (2002) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2002). 
51. See id. at *5-7 (stating reasons for defendant's request to withdraw guilty 
plea). 
52. See id. at *18. 
53. 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
54. See id. at 465; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 
(2002) (establishing burden of proof for child pornography prosecutions). 
55. Since the Free Speech ruling, some disagreement among the courts has sur- 
faced as to whether defendants must actually know an image is of a real child or 
whether a belief is sufficient. Compare United States v. Tynes, 58 M.J. 704, 706-07 
(A. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (requiring that defendant present evidence that minors 
in depictions were computer-generated as affirmative defense), with United States 
v. Pabon-Cruz, 255 F. Supp. 2d 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (requiring proof that 
defendant knew images were made of actual, rather than virtual, children to s u p  
port criminal conviction for possession of child pornography). 
56. See, e.g., Pabon-Crur, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (noting defendant's argument 
that "the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew that the photographs 
contained images of actual children and that such knowledge was a required ele- 
ment" to sustain child pornography conviction). 
57. United States v. Marcus, 239 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting 
district court's refusal to permit withdrawal of guilty plea). 
58. 239 F. Supp. 2d 277, 281-84 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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types of presentation are, o r  become as technology improves, 
ind is t ing~ishable .~~  
The Marcus court's prediction was confirmed. Until recently, all 
courts have rejected defense assertions that the Free Speech ruling mandates 
that the government either provide the identity of the children portrayed 
in pornographic images o r  supply expert testimony that the images are of 
actual children.60 Courts have ruled that such expert testimony is not re- 
quired because, as the Tenth Circuit stated in United States v. Kimh,61 
"Ijluries are still' capable of distinguishing between real and virtual 
imagesn6* 
In May 2004, however, the First Circuit in United States v. H i l t ~ n ~ ~  man- 
dated that the government introduce evidence, in addition to the images, to 
prove the children depicted were The court indicated that such 
evidence could constitute testimony by a computer graphics expert that 
the images were not virtual.65 Significantly, the court specifically rejected 
one type of expert testimony widely used in other cases in which, applying 
the Tanner Scale of physical development, the expert testifies that the 
images portray a child rather than an adult.66 The Hilton court noted that 
a virtual pornographer would seek to create images that "would be amena- 
ble to expert testimony under the Tanner Scale," and therefore an expert 
would not necessarily be able to tell if the child portrayed was real or vir- 
t ~ a l . ~ '  Accordingly, the court vacated the defendant's child pornography 
59. See id. at 283. In other cases, the failure to directly appeal pre-Free Speech 
convictions has limited some defendants to establishing their actual innocence of 
the child pornography charges, which, to date, no defendant has been able to do. 
See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 231 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (D. Me. 2002) (noting 
failure to appeal convictions has hindered ability to establish innocence); United 
States v. Oakes, 224 F. Supp. 2d 296, 300-01 (D. Me. 2002) (same). 
60. See, e.g., Unites States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003) (re- 
jecting expert testimony); United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 
2003) (same); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2002) (same). 
61. 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003). 
62. Id. at 1142. 
63. 363 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2004). 
64. See id. at 64 (discussing evidence requirement). 
65. See id. at 65 n.6 (noting that direct evidence of child's identity would also 
s&ice). 
66. See id. at 60. The Tanner scale looks at breast and genital development as 
a means of assessing the age of the person depicted. See id. 
67. Id. at 66. The Hilton court noted: 
We find more commonsensical a proposition leading to the contrary in- 
ference that someone manufacturing images to look like children will 
try-and with sufficient technology will manage-to produce images that 
would be amenable to expert analysis under the Tanner Scale. Whatever 
parameters of body proportion, growth and development serve as signs of 
age under the Tanner Scale, those parameters will be mimicked by the 
virtual pornographer-whether by design or as a byproduct of the goal of 
realism. What a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt demands is 
evidence that the indicators of youth apparent to the untrained eye be- 
long to an actual child. Accordingly, we find the government's conten- 
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conviction, notwithstanding that thousands of images were found on the 
defendant's computer.68 
Hilton is the first case to require evidence beyond the images to estab- 
lish that the defendant knowingly possessed child pornography. With it 
comes an explicit acknowledgment that technology may have reached a 
point that juries will not be able to distinguish real from virtual without 
guidance. While other courts have criticized H i l t ~ n , ~ ~  this may well be the 
first indication of what Justice Thomas noted in Free Speech that, should 
technology reach the point that the government is unable to distinguish 
an image of actual from virtual pornography, regulation of the latter 
would be perrni~s ible .~~ 
The Free Speech ruling has had other significant trial strategy implica- 
tions. For example, in United States v. Pabon-Cr~z,~~ the defendant, who 
had been found guilty of receiving and distributing child pornography, 
moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence that he 
knew the images were of actual children.7* The court denied the motion 
because the defendant had stipulated that the images were of actual chil- 
dren.73 In the alternative, the defendant moved for a new trial based on 
the prejudicial effect of the admission of the pornographic images found 
on the defendant's computer.74 The court similarly rejected the request, 
finding that the photographs were "extremely relevant" to the defendant's 
claim that he did not know the images were of actual children.75 
These cases demonstrate that the. government's fears of the difficulty 
in prosecuting pumeyors of child pornography are real and growing. A p  
pellate courts have reversed convictions, some without the opportunity of 
retrial, and set aside guilty pleas. Yet, at this point no jury has acquitted a 
tion that Dr. Ricci [(the government's expert witness)] presented 
sufficient evidence to prove that the children represented were real 
unavailing. 
Id. 
68. See id. at 60. Significantly, the government introduced only seven images. 
See id. at 60. Hilton had a convoluted procedural history commencing with the 
defendant's arrest in 1997 as his was one of the first cases to contest the constitu- 
tionality of the CPPA. See id. (emphasizing importance of case). 
69. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Holze, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 383, *18 (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 4, 2004) (criticizing Hilton case). 
70. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 259 (2002) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) ("[Ilf technological advances thwart prosecution of 'unlawful 
speech,' the Government may well have a compelling interest in bamng or other- 
wise regulating some narrow category of 'lawful speech' in order to enforce effec- 
tively laws against pornography made through the abuse of real children."). 
71. 255 F. Supp. 2d 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
72. See id. at 204 (providing example of implication of Free Speech ruling). 
73. See id.; see also united States v. Tanner, 66 Fed. Appx. 449, 450 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
74. See Pabon-Crug 255 F .  Supp. 2d at 213. 
75. See id. 
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defendant on the basis that he was ignorant that the pornographic images 
were of real children.76 
Trial strategy continues to evolve. If defendants do not stipulate that 
the images are of actual children, the veracity of their claimed ignorance 
of the photographs' authenticity will put the images into the jury's hands. 
Most defendants vigorously object to the introduction of the images into 
evidence, cognizant of the effect they will have on the jury. Similarly, 
where the appellate courts have had access to the images, most have u p  
held pornography convictions, even under pre-Free Speech jury instruc- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Surely, however, given the Free Speech ruling, defendants will weigh 
much more closely the decision to stipulate as to the authenticity of por- 
nographic images so as to put the Government to its proof. Now, with at 
least one circuit requiring expert testimony of a picture's veracity, stipula- 
tions surely will diminish and battles of experts surely will increase. 
What can be done to protect actual children? The Free Speech Court 
rejected outright some of the government's arguments for a ban on virtual 
pornography, yet left the door open for new legislati~n.'~ Congress re- 
sponded with the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Ex- 
ploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, otherwise known as the 
PROTECT Act.79 The following section describes those provisions relat- 
ing to the virtual pornography problem.80 
IV. THE PROTECT ACT 
The congressional findings in support of the PROTECT Act are in 
direct response to the Free Speech ruling. The thrust of the legislative find- 
ings is that prosecutors are being hampered in their ability to prosecute 
child  pornographer^.^^ The rationale for this inability, however, differs 
radically from earlier findings. In 1996, congressional findings linked that 
inability to prosecute to advancements in technology that made "it possi- 
ble to produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means visual depictions 
of what appear to be children . . . that are virtually indistinguishable from 
76. See generally Feldmeier, supra note 11 (noting no jury has acquitted based 
on lack of knowledge defense). 
77. See United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1063 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(providing example). 
78. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 259 (2002) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing possibility of new legislation). 
79. 18 U.S.C. !j 2252A (2000 & Supp. 111 2003). 
80. See id. (emphasizing that main thrust of Act was to establish a nationwide 
"AMBER Alert."). The discussion that follows highlights those sections of the 
PROTECT Act relevant to this Article and is not meant as an exhaustive descrip 
tion of the Act. 
81. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10&21,501, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) [herein- 
after Congressional Findings]. 
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actual . . . ~ h i l d r e n . " ~ ~  In stark contrast, the new congressional findings 
concede "there is no substantial evidence that any of the child pornogra- 
phy images being traff~cked today were made other than by the abuse of 
real ~ h i l d r e n . " ~ ~  Because of the Free Speech ruling, however, Congress 
found that many defendants have suggested that they did not know the 
images they possessed were of actual children, rather than virtual chil- 
d ~ - e n . ~ ~  Moreover, the new congressional findings stated that technology 
does exist "to disguise depictions of real children to make them unidentifi- 
able and to make depictions of real children appear computer-gener- 
ated."85 It found further that "technology will soon exist, if it does not 
already, to computer generate realistic images of children."s6 
Based on these findings, the PROTECT Act amended existing child 
pornography laws contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B) to define child 
pornography as including images that are "indistinguishable from" that of 
a "minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."87 In a direct nod to Jus- 
tice O'Connor, Congress defined the term "indistinguishable" to mean a 
depiction that is "virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such 
that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude that the 
depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct."88 
To fit within Free Speech's mandate, the definition expressly excludes depic- 
tions "that are drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting mi- 
nors or adults."89 
The PROTECT Act also amended the CPPA's affirmative defense that 
the Free Speech Court found too narrow. First, Congress extended the af- 
82. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,100 Stat. 
3009 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 5 2251 (1996)). 
83. Congressional Findings, supra note 81, 5 501 (7). 
84. See id. 
85. See id., 5 501 (5). 
86. Id. 
87. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(8)(B) (2000 & Supp. 111 2003). 
88. Id. 5 2256(11). See generally Congressional Findings, supra note 81, 
5 502(c) (amending definition of "indistinguishable" under 5 2256(11)). 
89. 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(11). See generally Congressional Findings, supra note 81, 
5 502(c). The PROTECT Act also expanded the pandering provision struck down 
by the Free Speech ruling to punish anyone who: 
[Aldvertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, 
or in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by com- 
puter, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the 
belief. . . that the material or purported material is, or contains-(i) an 
obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con- 
duct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct. 
18 U.S.C. 5 2252A(a) (3) (B). This section has been attacked as unconstitutional 
because of the "purported materials" provisions. See Letter on S. 151 from Laura 
W. Murphy, Director, ACLU, & Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to 
Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], auailabb at 
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=l1806&c=252http://www.aclu.org/ 
Privacy/Privacy.~fm?ID=ll806&~=252. 
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firmative defense beyond producers a n d  distributors to those who possess 
child p o r n ~ g r a p h y . ~ ~  Secondly, the affirmative defense allows defendants 
to prove that the images were created completely by computer graphics.g1 
Congress also amended the record-keeping requirements of produc- 
ers of  p o r r ~ o g r a p h y . ~ ~  The  original requirements were enacted to protect 
minors from being used in  pornographic films and visual depictions by 
requiring producers to ascertain the ages of  the actors employed, keep 
records of  this information and affix a statement to all copies of porno- 
graphic materials as to where the records could b e  found.g3 I t  required 
that "[w] hoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, 
o r  o ther  matter which . . . contains o n e  or more  visual depictions . . . of 
actual sexually explicit conduct," shall create a n d  maintain records that 
validate that minors were not  used.g4 T h e  original provisions defined 
90. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2252A(c) (delineating afXrmative defenses). See generally 
id. § 2252A (a) (5) (B) (expanding federal prohibition against child pornography 
to those who merely possess such materials). 
91. See id. 5 2252A(c). CPPA's -rmative defense was limited to establishing 
that adults were used. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 
(2002) (noting government's interpretation that CPPA shifted burden to accused 
to prove their speech was lawful). It does not extend, however, to images of 
morphed children. See id. at 256 (noting "the affirmative defense provides no pro- 
tection to persons who produce speech by using computer imaging, or through 
other means that do not involve the use of adult actors who appear to be minors"). 
But cf: 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (providing &rrnative defense if child pornography 
was produced without actual minors). 
In addition, the PROTECT Act creates a new crime of obscene child pornog- 
raphy that provides for harsher penalties than ordinary obscenity. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1466A. Under the new statute, penalties are imposed on any person who "know- 
ingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute" either 
an obscene depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct or any im- 
age of a minor engaging in "graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse," or 
any form of sexual intercourse. See id. 5 1466A(a) (1)-(2) (A). Furthermore, any 
material that "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" shall also 
be subject to a reprimand. See id. § 1466A(a) (2) (B). The statue further provides 
that " [i] t is not a required element of any offense under this section that the minor 
depicted actually exist." Id. 5 1466A(c). Much controversy exists over this new 
section because it does not require that a depiction is deemed obscene under the 
prevailing constitutional principles. See Feldmeier, supra note 11, at 208, 217; 
ACLU Letter, supra note 89. This new obscenity crime follows the suggestion of 
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which is that the best 
approach in addressing child pornography is through obscenity laws, because 
"99-100 percent of all child pornography would be found to be obscene by most 
judges andjuries." 149 CONG. REC. S2573-02, S2580 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (state- 
ment of Sen. Leahy) (quoting National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil- 
dren's answer to written questions submitted after Congressional hearing). 
92. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2257 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
93. See id. (listing requirements); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b) (2000 & Supp. 
I11 2003) (mirroring CPPA's requisite recording of performers' ages); id. 
§ 2257(e) (1) (mandating similar obligation, as that under CPPA, to attach notice 
on all pornographic materials identifying location of all records on performers). 
94. See 18 U.S.C. fj 2257(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Note the definitions of 
producers as primary or secondary as established in the Code of Federal Regula- 
tions. See 28 C.F.R. § 75.7(b) (1992) (explaining that, if primary and secondary 
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"produces7' as meaning "to produce, manufacture, or publish any book, 
magazine, periodical, film, video tape, or other similar matter."95 
Additionally, Congress had originally authorized the Attorney Gen- 
eral to issue regulations to implement the record-keeping  provision^.^^ 
Following public comments on proposed regulations, the Attorney Gen- 
eral included an exemption to the record-keeping requirements that is 
particularly relevant in light of the amendments to Section 2257. In the 
Code of Federal Regulations Section 75.7, an exemption from the record- 
keeping requirements is permitted for depictions of simulated sexually ex- 
plicit cond~c t .~ '  The regulation requires that a statement referring to the 
exemption be attached to the material.98 
The PROTECT Act amended Section 2257's definition of "producesn 
to include "computer generated image [s] , digital image [s] , or pic- 
t u r e [ ~ ] . " ~ ~  It further provides that information or evidence obtained or 
required by Section 2257 may be used in any child pornography prosecu- 
tion.loO Previously, such evidence was limited to use solely in prosecutions 
for violations of Section 2257. The significance of these changes is dis- 
cussed below. 
A. The Questionable Constitutionality of the PROTECT Act 
The PROTECT Act has narrowed the ban on virtual child pornogra- 
phy to those depictions that are "indistinguishable from that of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."101 Some commentators have 
noted that the "indistinguishable" language will not survive constitutional 
attack because it does not remedy the core finding in Free Speech-that the 
actual danger from pornography to children is that they are exploited in 
its creation.lo2 Nevertheless, a ban on virtually indistinguishable pornog- 
raphy would aid the government's position that it will be unable to prose- 
cute actual pornographers as technology advances. Furthermore, that 
rationale may override all other concerns and allow for a ban on virtual 
producers are separate, primary producer can delegate duty to affix notice on por- 
nographic materials to secondary producer). 
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). But cf: 18 U.S.C. 
5 2257(h) (3) (2000 & Supp. I11 2003) (adding "computer generated image, digital 
image, or picture" to list of materials). 
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(g) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(g) (2000 & Supp. 111 2003) (maintaining original provision from CPPA). 
97. See 28 C.F.R. § 75.7(a) (2). Also exempt are depictions made prior to No- 
vember 1, 1990, the effective date of the original enactment. See id. § 75.7(a) ( 1 ) .  
98. See id. § 75.7(a). 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h)(3) (2000 & Supp. 111 2003). 
100. See id. § 2257(d) (2). 
101. Id. § 2256(8) ( B ) .  
102. See, e.g., Feldmeier, supra note 11. See generally Jasmin J. Farhangian, 
Comment, A Problem of "Virtual" Proportions: The D@culties Inherent in Tailoring Vir- 
tual Child Pornography Laws to Meet Constitutional Standards, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 241 
(2003). 
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pornography that is indistinguishable from actual child pornography. At 
this point, however, as acknowledged in the new congressional finding, 
technology has not yet reached the point where it can create a completely 
virtual child that is indistinguishable from an actual child.lo5 Therefore, 
the "indistinguishable from" language bears the same constitutional infir- 
mity that befell the CPPA's "appears to be" language. 
In addition to being overbroad, the new "indistinguishable from" lan- 
guage is unconstitutionally vague. Its definition of "indistinguishablen is 
linked to an "ordinary" person standard.lo4 Who is the "ordinary" person? 
Does it differ from a "reasonable" person? If it is meant to be synonymous 
with the latter, other problems arise. The mens rea of Section 2252 is 
"knowingly," yet the assessment of whether an image is child pornography 
is whether an ordinary person would so think.lo5 Thus, defendants who 
do not know that they possess child pornography, where it is in the form 
of a virtual image, can be convicted if an ordinary person would believe 
the image was of an actual child. In effect, defendants are being convicted 
on a negligence standard rather than the "knowingly" mens rea stated in 
the statute and mandated by the Supreme Court.'06 
The expanded defense available to those charged with v ie  
lating the Act may not survive constitutional scrutiny because, although it 
extends to producers, distributors and possessors, it is difficult to see how 
anyone other than the producer of virtual pornography would be able to 
establish that no actual children were used. As the Free Speech Court rea- 
soned, if the government professes difficulty in establishing that an image 
is of an actual child, "it will be at least as difficult for the innocent posses- 
 or."^^^ Nevertheless, the majority did not rule out the possibility of an 
appropriately drawn affirmative defense.lo8 The PROTECT Act addresses 
some of these concerns with the change in the affirmative defense cou- 
pled with the changes in the record-keeping requirement. With some revi- 
103. Morphing is child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(8) (C); Timothy J. 
Perla, Note, Attempting to End the Cycle of Virtual Pmnography Prohibitions, 83 B.U. L. 
REV. 1209, 1212 n.10, 1213 11.21 (2003) (affirming CPPA and PROTECT Act's 
prohibitions of morphing visuals to appear as though "identifiable minor is engag- 
ing in sexually explicit conduct"). See generally Congressional Findings, supra note 
81, 5 501 (5) ("The technology will soon exist . . . to computer generate realistic 
images of children.") (emphasis added). 
104. 18 U.S.C. 5 2256 states that "the term 'indistinguishable' used with re- 
spect to a depiction, means virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such 
that an ordina7y person viewing the depiction would conclude that the depiction is 
of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(11) 
(emphasis added). 
105. Compare id. 5 2252, with id. Fj 2256(11). 
106. But see United States v. X-Citement Video, lnc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) 
(holding that 5 2252 requires knowledge of both sexually explicit nature of mate- 
rial and age of performers). 
107. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255-56 (2002). 
108. See id. at 256. 
Heinonline - -  50 Vill. L. Rev. 101 2005 
102 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50: p. 87 
sions, the record-keeping provisions can be the cornerstone of legislation 
that protects virtual pornographers and actual children. 
V. REGULATION OF THE VIRTUAL PORNOGRAPHY ~ ~ A R K E T  
, , 
Since the Supreme Court endorsed virtual pornography as a positive, 
a commercial market for virtual pornography could develop. With it, so 
could come some of the protections Congress seeks. Certainly, if the Su- 
preme Court is correct and the existence of a virtual pornography market 
results in the reduced exploitation of actual children in the creation of 
pornography-that could be a positive result, depending on a few crucial 
assumptions. First, one would have to accept the Court's contention that 
"[flew pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if 
fictional, computerized images would Unfortunately, many ex- 
perts on child molesters explain that these individuals derive sexual gratifi- 
cation from the pain inflicted on actual children, and the recording of 
it."o These producers of child pornography would not be interested in 
virtual pornography. Concomitantly, some purveyors of child pornogra- 
phy would also not have their appetites satiated if they knew they were 
viewing images of virtual pornography. It is possible, therefore, that only a 
small class of pornographers-those who are in it solely for profit-fit the 
Free Speech rationale. Whether crimes against actual children will be re- 
duced is yet to be seen. 
As discussed in Part Three above, the government faces a great hurdle 
in post-Free Speech cases of establishing that defendants knew they possessed 
images of actual children. Government regulation of the virtual pornogra- 
phy industry would require labeling of images so as to verify that the 
images are virtual. Thus, the labeling provision may ultimately turn out to 
be the best method for prosecuting actual child pornographers-those 
who produce, distribute and possess child pornography-who would find 
it more difficult to claim lack of knowledge. Whether the labeling provi- 
sions are effective requires us to examine a number of issues. 
Since the Supreme Court declared virtual pornography was protected 
expression under the First Amendment, the first issue is whether Section 
2257 of the PROTECT Act unduly burdens this right. An examination of 
the legislative and judicial history of the original record-keeping provi- 
sions provides clear guidance. The original provisions were enacted for 
reasons that are strikingly similar (if not virtually identical) to the con- 
109. Id. at 254. 
110. See A. Nicholas Groth et al., The Child Molester: Clinical Observations, LITI- 
(I CATION AND ADMINSTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES CRIMINAL LAW AND 
URBAN PROBLEMS, (Practicing Law Institute), Jan. 27, 1989, at 323 ("Child molesta- 
tion is the sexual expression of nonsexual needs and unresolved life issues."); 
COURT TV'S CRIME LIBRARY, Child Molestation, ("Molesters engage in sex with chil- 
dren for a variety of reasons and sometimes these reasons have little to do with 
sexual desires."), at http://www.crimelibrary.com/criminal~mind/psycholo~/ 
pedophiles/2. html?sect=19 (last visited Jan. 18, 2005). 
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cerns raised by computer-generated images. According to the 1986 Attor- 
ney General's Commission on Pornography, which was the catalyst for the 
amendments to the original 1984 child pornography legi~lation,~ regula- 
tions were necessary to stem the use of children in pornographic films and 
pictures."* Additionally, the report noted that requiring producers of 
pornographic materials to ascertain the ages of the actors they employ 
would eliminate claims of mistake or ignorance.ll5 
Producers and distributors of adult pornography immediately chal- 
lenged the record-keeping provisions as unduly burdensome on their First 
Amendment rights.l14 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, in American Libraly Association v. Reno,l l5 found that the 
provisions and related regulations116 were constitutional. In doing so, the 
court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the record-keeping provisions 
were content-based; instead, the court ruled that "it is clear that Congress 
enacted the Act [The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 
19881 not to regulate the content of sexually explicit materials, but to pro- 
tect children by deterring the production and distribution of child 
pornography."ll 
The Reno court further reasoned that content-neutral regulations are 
constitutional if narrowly tailored, serve a significant governmental inter- 
est and leave ample alternative channels of c o m m u n i ~ a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  Applying 
that test to the record-keeping provisions, the court noted that they were 
narrowly tailored to the prevention of child pornography because they ful- 
filled three goals: 
111. See A m .  Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
112. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 618-20 ("Despite the umbrella p r e  
tection provided by the Child Protection Act of 1984, loopholes remain that per- 
mit the continued exploitation of children."). 
11 3. See id. at 620. 
114. SeeAm. Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412 (D.D.C. 1992, affd in part, 
rev'd in part, sub nom. A m .  Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Am. 
Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated by, sub nom. 
A m .  Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
115. 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Reno court tailored the scope of the 
record-keeping provisions by disallowing certain provisions and regulations. See id. 
at 90-92. For example, it narrowed the scope of "secondary producers" and invali- 
dated the requirement that producers keep records as long as they remain in busi- 
ness. See id. at 91,93. Later cases further refined the definition of "producer." See 
Sundance Assocs., Inc. v. Reno, 139 F.3d 804 (10th Cir. 1998) (clarifying definition 
of "producer" under Child Protection and Obscenity Act); see also Connection Dis- 
trib. co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1998) (same). 
116. See 28 C.F.R. § 75 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 15017 (1992). 
117. Reno, 33 F.3d at 86. The court noted that the goals of the record-keeping 
provisions were threefold: first, to prevent the exploitation of children; second, to 
deprive child pornographers of access to commercial markets; and third, to aid law 
enforcement in identifying the performers in sexually explicit materials to verify 
compliance with the law. See id. at 89. 
118. See id. at 88. 
Heinonline - -  50 Vill. L. Rev. 103 2005 
104 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50: p. 87 
It ensures that primary producers actually confirm that a pro- 
spective performer is of age; it deters children from attempting 
to pass as adults; and most important, it creates the only mecha- 
nism by which secondary producers (who by definition have no 
contact with performers) can be required to verify the ages of the 
individuals pictured in the materials they will be producing.11g 
Employing the Reno court's rationale to virtual pornography, the reg- 
ulation of virtual pornography should survive a constitutional challenge 
that it unduly burdens protected speech. The same goals and concerns 
apply to underage record-keeping provisions and virtual record-keeping 
provisions. In both instances, the goal is to prevent the exploitation of 
children. In both situations, the concern is that, without the provisions, 
law enforcement is hampered in its ability to prosecute child 
pornographers who claim lack of knowledge of the true nature of the 
materials produced, distributed or possessed. 
The second issue concerning the language of the newly amended Set- 
- - - 
tion 2257 presents a more difficult constitutional challenge. The Section 
- 
now requires that "whoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, 
film, videotape, or other matter which . . . contains one or more visual 
depictions . . . of actual sexually explicit conduct," shall create and maintain 
records that validate that minors were not used.120 The PROTECT Act 
amendments define "produces" to include "computer generated  image[^]."'^^ 
Herein lies the problem that renders the Section constitutionally void 
for vagueness: How can someone produce a computer-generated image of 
"actual sexually explicit conduct?"f it is computer-generated, or virtual, 
it does not contain actual'conduct.122 The statute does not define "actual 
sexually explicit conduct" except to state that it does not include "simu- 
lated conduct."123 Moreover, judicial interpretation of the latter term is 
scant.lZ4 Notably however, during Senate debates on the PROTECT Act, 
Senator Leahy pointed out a similar ambiguity in the proposed new defini- 
119. Id. at 89. 
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a) (1) (2000 & Supp. I11 2003) (emphasis added). 
121. Id. § 2257(h) (3) (emphasis added). 
122. See 149 CONG. REC. S2573-02, S2578 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement 
of Sen. Leahy) (attacking 2252A and amending it to remove "actual sexually ex- 
plicit conduct"). 
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h) (1). 
124. See United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
h i e d ,  124 S.Ct. 2871 (2004) (holding definition of "sexually explicit conduct" in- 
cluding term "simulated" not void for vagueness). CJ United States v. Carroll, 190 
F.3d 290, 298 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that superimposing minor's face on 
body of person exhibiting genitals does not violate § 2251 (a), which prohibits de- 
fendant from enticing or using minor to engage in actual or simulated sexually 
explicit conduct), vacated in part and reinstated in part by, 227 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 
2000) (per curium). In its opinion, the Carroll court noted that "our search did 
not reveal another court's interpretation of the 'simulated . . . lascivious exhibi- 
tion' language." Id. at 294 n.6 (citation omitted). 
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tions of child p~rnography. '~~ Originally, the statute prohibited visual de- 
pictions, including computer-generated images that were 
"indistinguishable from that of an actual minor" engaging in sexually ex- 
plicit ~0nduct . l~~ Nevertheless, the definition of "sexually explicit conduct" 
covered "actual sexual interco~rse." '~~ Senator Leahy stated that he 
believed: 
[Tlhere is a vagueness concern in the new statute 2252A [en- 
acted as 22561 because, while it is clearly aimed at "virtual" child 
pornography (where no real children are involved), it still re- 
quires "actual" conduct. In the realm of computer generated 
images, however, the distinction between actual and simulated 
conduct makes no sense.128 
In response, the final version of the statute deleted the term "actual" and 
replaced it with the term ''graphi~.'' '~~ Thus, the regulation provision as 
presently constructed will not withstand constitutional scrutiny because of 
its contradictory, and therefore vague, language. 
To rectify this ambiguity, Congress should amend Section 2257 to 
clarify its requirements with respect to producers of adult pornography 
and producers of virtual pornography by creating two separate parts as 
illustrated in Appendix One. The proposed Section 2257(1), as ap- 
pended, should be limited to production of actual sexually explicit con- 
duct involving real actors. The proposed Section 2257(II), as appended, 
should be drafted with respect to producers of virtual pornography. Be- 
cause the creation of virtual pornography does not involve actual individu- 
als, there is no need for the verification requirements in 2257(b). Instead, 
the proposed Section 2257(II)(b), as appended, should be created 
whereby producers of virtual pornography will record the methods used to 
create the virtual images, the specific program and software used, the 
names and addresses of the programmers who created the images, the 
location of the computer used in the production and the date of creation, 
as well as other records necessary to verify that no actual minors were used 
in the production. 
The regulations promulgated to enforce the record-keeping provision 
added an exemption that also needs to be adjusted in light of the amend- 
125. See 149 CONG. REG. S2573-02, S2578 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement 
of Sen. Leahy) (discussing Hatch-Leahy bill provisions that alter definition of 
"child pornography"). 
126. See id. at S2575 (detailing amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2256). 
127. Id. (emphasis added). The definition also covered "lascivious simulated 
sexual intercoursen. Id. 
128. Id. at S2581. Senator Leahy stressed that he fears "clever defendants 
might seek to argue that this new provision still requires proof [of] 'actual' sexual 
acts involving real children." Id. 
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (B) (i) (2004) (defining characteristics of "sexu- 
ally explicit conductn). 
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ments to Section 2257.130 Under the Code of Federal Regulations Section 
75.7, depictions of simulated sexually explicit conduct are exempt from 
the record-keeping requirements.13' This regulation directly conflicts 
with Congress's intent to extend the record-keeping requirement to cre- 
ators of virtual pornography.13* Therefore, the regulation must be 
changed to eliminate the exemption for simulated sexually explicit con- 
duct created by computer techn01ogy.l~~ 
The  new record-keeping provision states that evidence or  information 
obtained from the mandated records can now be used in the prosecution 
of any child pornography offense, rather than just labeling offenses.134 
This significantly expands the scope of Section 2257, which previously lim- 
ited the use of information o r  evidence obtained from the records only to 
prosecutions for violating the record-keeping provision.135 The  impetus 
for the original record-keeping legislation-the Attorney General's Com- 
mission o n  Pornography-stated that the information contained in the 
records should not be used in pornography prosecutions so as to avoid 
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination concerns.ls6 Congress obeyed, thus 
precluding any judicial o r  scholarly examination of the issue.13' The  self- 
130. For a discussion of the record-keeping requirements on producers of 
pornography, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
131. See 28 C.F.R. 5 75.7(a) (2) (2004) (providing exemption for record-keep 
ing requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a)-(c) (2004)). 
132. See 149 CONG. kc .  S2573-02, S2584 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement 
of Sen. Hatch) (discussing new provisions of PROTECT Act). Senator Hatch 
noted that the new record-keeping "expands the scope of materials covered to 
reflect the computerized manner in which they are increasingly being distributed 
and sold. Producers of such sexually explicit materials must make and maintain 
records confirming that no actual minors were involved in the making of the sexu- 
ally explicit materials." See id. 
133. Simulated sexually explicit conduct using actual adults would still be sub- 
ject to the existing exemption. For example, images merely suggesting off camera 
sexual activity would be exempt. See Child Protection Restoration and Penalties 
Enhancement Act of 1990,57 Fed. Reg. 15,017,15,019 (Apr. 24,1992) (codified at 
28 C.F.R. pt. 75). 
134. 149 CONG. REc. S2573-02, S2578 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) ("These 
records, which will be helpful in proving that the material in question is not 'vir- 
tual' child pornography, may be used in federal child pornography and obscenity 
prosecutions under this Act."). 
135. Id. (noting need for changed record-keeping requirements). 
136. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 621 (stating that information in 
records should not be used in prosecution so as to avoid Fifth Amendment 
problems). 
137. To the contrary, initial challenges to Section 2257's constitutionality as- 
serted that it was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest 
because the evidence could not be used in a child pornography prosecution. See 
Amer. Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 417 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that Act 
applies to all depictions of actual sexually explicit conduct regardless of age or 
apparent age of model), affd in part, rev'd i n  part, sub nom. Am. Library Ass'n v. 
Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding requirement to hold records for 
minimum of five years but struck down requirement to hold records indefinitely); 
h e r .  Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp 469,478 (D.D.C. 1989) (d' ISCUSS- 
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incrimination concerns were revived in Senate debates on the PROTECT 
Act's amendment to Section 2257 enlarging its scope.138 The resultant 
expanded scope now demands an examination of such self-incrimination 
issues. 
The Fifth Amendment states that a person cannot be compelled to 
incriminate him or herself.lS9 Yet, the privilege against self-incrimination 
is not absolute. In two related areas, the courts have demarcated limita- 
tions on the privilege. The first concerns records that the government 
requires of those engaged in a regulated industry. Such "required 
records" are not privileged even if they may incriminate the record- 
keeper.140 This doctrine limits the right against self-incrimination if three 
criteria are met. First, the documents must be kept for an "essentially reg- 
ulatory" purpose; second, the records must be of; kind that the regulated 
party has customarily kept; and third, the records have assumed public 
aspects, which make them analogous to public records.l4I 
In the seminal case Shapiro v. United States,14* the defendant, a whole- 
saler of produce during World War 11, was subject to the record-keeping 
- 
provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act, which required him to 
record price, sale and delivery inf0rmati0n.l~~ The defendant claimed his 
privilege against self-incrimination after being ordered to produce his 
records and prosecuted for violating the In rejecting the defen- 
dant's constitutional claim, the supreme Court noted-that the congres- 
- 
sional intent behind the record-keeping provision was to aid law 
enforcement, and therefore, Congress could not have intended to make 
ing constitutional problems with Section 2257) vacated by, sub nom. Am. Library 
Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Amer. Library Ass'n v. Reno, 
47 F.3d 1215, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating there is serious 
risk that Section 2257 burdens substantially more speech than necessary). Presum- 
ably the expanded scope of the amended Section 2257 allays this concern. 
138. See 148 CONG. REc. S 11,199, 11,204 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002) (statement 
of Sen. Leahy) ("[Rlequiring producers to maintain records at the risk of criminal 
liability for not doing so, which records can be used against them in a child por- 
nography prosecution, violates the constitutional prohibition against mandatory 
self-incrimination."). 
139. SeeU.S. CONST. amend V ("[Nlor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself. . . ."). 
140. See generally, Bernard D. Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and 
the Privilege Against Self-lnm'mination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 687 (1951) (discussing re- 
quired records doctrine and effect on constitutional privilege against self-incrimi- 
nation); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its LRssons for the 
Pn'vilege Against Self-lcrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1986) (same). 
141. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968) (detailing prem- 
ises of required records doctrine). See generally Jeremy Hugh Temkin, "Hollow Rit- 
ual[~]":  The Fz$h Amendment and SelfRepwting Schemes, 34 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1986) 
(discussing required records doctrine and self-incrimination). 
142. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). 
143. See id. at 4 (noting defendant's occupation and his required federal 
records). 
144. See id. at 5 (stating that defendant produced records, but claimed consti- 
tutional privilege). 
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them ~r iv i1eged . l~~  The majority reasoned that documents required to be 
kept for the public benefit were not ~r iv i1eged. I~~ Justice Frankfurter dis- 
sented on the grounds that the mere requirement that records be kept 
does not make them public records that are outside the scope of Fifth 
Amendment protection.147 He stressed that for records to be exempt 
from constitutional protection, the public should have "the same right 
that the Government has to peruse [these records], if not to use, 
them."148 
Recently, in Environmmtal Defense Fund, Inc. v. L~rnphier, '~~ the defen- 
dant argued that compelling him to notify the EPA of hazardous waste 
activities and requiring him to obtain a permit for those activities forced 
him to make incriminating disclosures in violation of the Fifth Arnend- 
ment.I5O The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention, and ruled that the 
regulatory scheme set up by Congress to monitor the hazardous waste in- 
dustry was not to outlaw the hazardous waste business, but rather to bring 
people into compliance.151 Making an analogy to Shapiro, the court 
noted, "records required as part of a valid regulatory scheme (as opposed 
to a ploy to entrap gamblers, drug dealers, etc.) are not barred on fifth 
amendment grounds even though they may contain incriminating 
information.n152 
Closely related to, but distinct from, the required records doctrine are 
self-reporting requirements. These statutory schemes require individuals 
to provide information to the government. The extent to which the gov- 
ernment can use such information against the provider also implicates the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
In three cases decided on the same day and known as the "trilogy," 
the Supreme Court attempted to delineate the scope of the privilege in 
self-reporting cases.153 The Court determined that where the activity for 
145. See id. at 15 (stating that Congress's intent was to aid effective enforce- 
ment of record-keeping requirements and did not intend private privilege to 
attach). 
146. See id. at 32-33 (concluding that privilege of private papers cannot be 
maintained for documents "which are the appropriate subjects of governmental 
regulation" (quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1946))). 
147. See id. at 51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("If records merely because re- 
quired to be kept by law ips0 facto become public records, we are indeed living in 
glass houses."). 
148. Id. at 55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
149. 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983). 
150. See id. at 339 (stating Lamphier's constitutional argument). 
151. See id. ("In passing RCRA [Resource Conservation and Recovery Act], 
Congress did not outlaw the hazardous waste business; it merely set up a regulatory 
program for monitoring those activities."). 
152. Id. 
153. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (examining whether 
wagering tax statutes' registration requirements violated defendant's Fifth Arnend- 
ment privilege against self-incrimination); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 
63-64 (1968) (same); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (analyzing 
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which records were sought was essentially criminal, the self-incrimination 
privilege prevailed. In Marchetti v. United States,154 the defendant was a 
professional gambler, who failed to comply with Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) requirements that he supply the IRS with information about his 
gambling activities.155 The defendant failed to supply the information or 
to pay the requisite excise and occupational taxes on his wagering activi- 
ties.156 In challenging his convictions for income tax evasion, Mr. 
Marchetti argued that the self-reporting requirement violated his right 
against self-incrimination.15' The Supreme Court agreed by reasoning 
that, because gambling was illegal in all but one jurisdiction, the defen- 
dant would be required to admit criminal behavior by filling out the 
form.158 The Court distinguished Shapiro by stressing that reporting re- 
quirements in "'an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inter- 
est"' do not violate the right against self-incrimination, whereas the 
gambling regulation was incriminatory because it was targeting "a selective 
group inherently suspect of criminal a~tivities." '~~ 
Thus, the Supreme Court developed parallel lines of cases concern- 
ing the keeping of required records and self-reporting provisions. Com- 
mentators have noted the distinction between the two and the differing 
test for determining Fifth Amendment pr0b1ems.l~~ Nevertheless, in the 
whether firearm registration requirements violated defendant's Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination). 
154. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). For a discussion of the protections offered by the 
Fifth Amendment, see supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. 
155. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 40-41. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. at 41 (noting defendant's argument that "statutory obligations to 
register and pay occupational tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination"). 
158. See id. at 44-49 (stating that "petitioner's assertion of the privilege as a 
defense to this prosecution was entirely proper, and accordingly should have suf- 
ficed to prevent his conviction"). Similarly, Grosso involved a gambler who failed to 
comply with income tax statutes. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 63-64. H a y w  concerned 
the failure to self-report a firearm purchase. See Hayws, 390 U.S. at 85. 
159. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57 (quoting Alberston v. Subversive Activities 
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965)). Alberston involved a self-reporting scheme di- 
rected at members of the Communist Party, which the Supreme Court struck down 
because it was targeting a selective group "inherently suspect of criminal activities." 
Alberston v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965). For a discus- 
sion of Marchetti, see Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Larnphier, 714 F.2d 331, 339 (4th Cir. 
1983) ("[Wlhile reporting requirements in 'an essentially noncriminal and regu- 
latory area of inquiry' are permissible despite the possibility of incidental self-in- 
crimination, an inquiry directed to a 'selective group inherently suspect of 
criminal activities' is not."). 
160. See Temkin, supra note 141, at 467 n.2 (discussing distinction between 
required records and self-reporting provisions); see also Abraham Abramovsky, 
Monqr Laundering and Narcotics Prosecution, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 471, 495-97 (1986) 
(discussing line of cases where Supreme Court addressed Fifth Amendment privi- 
lege in self-reporting context); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Bouknight: Of Abused 
Children and the Parental Privilege Against Self-nm'mination, 76 IOWA L. REV. 535, 
540-47 (1991) (same). 
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initial congressional reports and hearings on the record-keeping provi- 
sions, it appears that Congress was relying too heavily on the self-reporting 
line of cases.161 In believing that Section 2257 was governed not by the 
required records line of cases, but instead by the self-reporting cases, the 
original record-keeping provisions unduly limited the evidentiary use of 
the information obtained by the records to find violations of Section 2257. 
The PROTECT Act's amendment expansion is permissible because 
the record-keeping provisions here do not deal with an "essentially crimi- 
nal" activity such as gambling. Under the Shapiro line of cases, Section 
2257 will survive constitutional scrutiny by satisfying the three established 
criteria. The first requirement is that the records must be kept for an 
"essentially regulatory" purpose.16* Here, because producers of virtual 
pornography are within their constitutional rights to engage in that activ- 
ity, the records they must keep are essentially regulatory. If producers 
comply with the record-keeping and labeling provisions, they are within 
their rights to produce the pornography-unlike the Marchetti petitioner, 
who risked gambling prosecutions because of the self-reporting 
requirements. 
The second requirement is that the records must be of the kind the 
regulated party has customarily kept.163 Because the field of virtual por- 
nography is so new, we cannot say that this criterion is met per se. Never- 
theless, we can see that the industry is already accustomed to keeping 
records of the actors employed in its productions by making an analogy to 
the record-keeping requirement for the producers of adult pornogra- 
phy.164 Requiring records that document the means used to create under- 
age virtual pornography should not be problematic. 
The third requirement is that the records must have public as- 
p e c t ~ . ' ~ ~  Justice Frankfurter's criteria in his Shapiro dissent highlights Sec- 
tion 2257s constitutionality with respect to this criterion-because the 
labeling would be required to be posted on all productions, it is certainly 
available to the public. 
Producers and distributors of virtual pornography should have no ob- 
jection to such labeling because it would allow them to exercise their First 
Amendment rights and protect them from unwarranted prosecution. The 
government would benefit from the labeling because it would be easier to 
prove that defendants knew they possessed actual child pornography if the 
images did not include a virtual pornography label. Moreover, it would 
ease the evidentiary burden of establishing that an image was of an actual 
161. See H.R. Doc. No. 100-129, at 55-106 (1987) (providing analysis of pro- 
posed Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1987 (citing Marchetti 
and Albertson) ) . 
162. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67-68 (stating first requirement). 
163. See id. at 68 (stating second requirement). 
164. For a discussion of record-keeping requirements for producers of por- 
nography, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
165. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 68 (stating third requirement). 
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child. Concomitantly, the record-keeping provision would aid the posses- 
sors of alleged child pornography in establishing their &rmative defense 
that the images they possessed were completely virtual. They can buttress 
this claim by introducing into evidence the label required by 2257 that 
states that the images are of adults or are completely computer-generated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the post-Free Speech child pornography cases illustrate, the govern- 
ment must prove two elements: first, that a pornographic image is of an 
actual child, and second, that the defendant had knowledge of the authen- 
ticity of the image.166 Protecting actual children and the rights of virtual 
pornographers can be accomplished by using the record-keeping provi- 
sions, as modified according to the suggestions made above. If the Su- 
preme Court is correct in its assessment that a virtual pornography market 
is desirable, then images generated by producers of virtual pornography 
will all contain the record-keeping label. Accordingly, those seeking con- 
stitutionally protected images will come to rely on the labe1.16' Concomi- 
tantly, the lack of a label can be used in a prosecution as evidence that the 
defendant knew he was dealing with actual child pornography. Thus, the 
best defense against child pornography may be to embrace virtual 
pornography. 
166. For a discussion of the government's burden of proof in post-Free Speech 
child pornography cases, see supra notes 40-80 and accompanying text. 
167. If a producer of child pornography falsely affixes a statement that the 
images are virtual, this analysis fails, but then so does the Supreme Court's premise 
that virtual pornography will dry up the market for actual child pornography. 
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APPENDIX 
MODEL STATUTE (Additions or amendments in italics) 
§ 2257. Record keeping requirements 
(a)  Who= produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, vi&otape, or picture or 
other matter of actual individuals which- 
(I) contains one or more visual depictions ma& after November 1, 1990 of 
actual sexualiy explicit conduct; and 
(2) is produced in whole or in part with materials which have been 
mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or is 
shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or transporta- 
tion in interstate or foreign commerce; 
shall create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining 
to every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction. 
(b) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall, with respect to every 
performer portrayed in a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit 
conduct- 
(1) ascertain, by examination of an identification document contain- 
ing such information, the performer's name and date of birth, 
and require the performer to provide such other indicia of his or 
her identity as may be prescribed by regulations; 
(2) ascertain any name, other than the performer's present and cor- 
rect name, ever used by the performer including maiden name, 
alias, nickname, stage, or professional name; and 
(3) record in the records required by subsection (a) the information 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection and such 
other identifying information as may be prescribed by regulation. 
(c) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall maintain the records 
required by this section at his business premises, or at such other 
place as the Attorney General may by regulation prescribe and shall 
make such records available to the Attorney General for inspection at 
all reasonable times. 
(dl 
(1) No information or evidence obtained from records required to 
be created or  maintained by this section shall, except as provided 
in this section, directly or indirectly, be used as evidence against 
any person with respect to any violation of law. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not preclude the use of 
such information or evidence in a prosecution or other action for 
a violation of this chapter or chapter 71 [18 USCS $5 2251 et seq. 
or 1460 et seq.], or for a violation of any applicable provision of 
law with respect to the furnishing of false information. 
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(1) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall cause to be af- 
fixed to every copy of any matter described in paragraph (1) of 
subsection (a) of this section, in such manner and in such form as 
the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, a statement 
describing where the records required by this section with respect 
to all performers depicted in that copy of the matter may be 
located. 
(2) If the person to whom subsection (a) of this section applies is an 
organization the statement required by this subsection shall in- 
clude the name, title, and business address of the individual em- 
ployed by such organization responsible for maintaining the 
records required by this section. 
(f) It shall be unlawful- 
(1) for any person to whom subsection (a) applies to fail to create or 
maintain the records as required by subsections (a) and (c) or by 
any regulation promulgated under this section; 
(2) for any person to whom subsection (a) applies knowingly to make 
any false entry in or knowingly to fail to make an appropriate en- 
try in, any record required by subsection (b) of this section or  any 
regulation promulgated under this section; 
(3) for any person to whom subsection (a) applies knowingly to fail to 
comply with the provisions of subsection (e) or any regulation 
promulgated pursuant to that subsection; and 
(4) for any person knowingly to sell or otherwise transfer, or offer for 
sale or transfer, any book, magazine, periodical, film, video, or 
other matter, produce in whole or in part with materials which 
have been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or 
which is intended for shipment in interstate or  foreign commerce, 
which- 
(A) contains one or more visual depictions made after the effec- 
tive date of this subsection of actual sexually explicit conduct; 
and 
(B) is produced in whole or in part with materials which have 
been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
is shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or 
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce; 
which does not have affixed thereto, in a manner prescribed as set 
forth in subsection (e ) ( l ) ,  a statement describing where the 
records required by this section may be located, but such person 
shall have no duty to determine the accuracy of the contents of 
the statement or the records required to be kept. 
(g) The Attorney General shall issue appropriate regulations to carry out 
this section. 
(h) As used in this section- 
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(1) the term "actual sexually explicit conduct" means actual but not 
simulated conduct as defined in subparagraphs (A) through (D) 
of paragraph (2) of section 2256 of this title; 
(2) "identification document" has the meaning given that term in 
section 1028(d) of this title; 
(3) the term "produces" means to produce, manufacture, or publish any book, 
magazine, periodical, film, video tape, picture, or other similar matter in- 
volving actual individuals and includes the duplication, reproduc- 
tion, or reissuing of any such matter, but does not include mere 
distribution or any other activity which does not involve hiring, 
contracting for managing, or otherwise arranging for the partici- 
pation of the performers depicted; and 
(4) the term "performer" includes any person portrayed in a visual 
depiction engaging in, or assisting another person to engage in, 
actual sexually explicit conduct. 
(i) Whoever violates this section shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 
years, and fined in accordance with the provisions of this title, or both. 
Whoever violates this section after having been convicted of a violation 
punishable under this section shall be imprisoned for any period of 
years not more than 10 years but not less than 2 years, and fined in 
accordance with the provisions of this title, or both. 
(a) Whoever produces by computer, digital or other similar means wholly virtual 
images: 
( I )  contains one or more visual depictions ma& after November 1, 1990 of 
sexually explicit conduct; and 
(2) is produced in whole or in  part with materials which have been mailed or 
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or is shipped or transported or is 
intended for shipment or transportation in interstate or f d g n  commerce; 
shall create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to 
e v q  image pmtrayed in such a visual depiction. 
(6) "Whoever produces any image covered u n h  this subsection shall affix to the 
production a statement that the images were completely created by computer and 
that no image of any actual minor was used in its production. The producer 
shall keep records of the methods used to create the virtual images, incluok the 
speczfic program and software used, the names and addresses of the program- 
mers who created the images, the location of the computer used in the Poduc- 
tion, the date of creation and other records necessary to vmilj that no actual 
minors were used in the production." 
(c) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall maintain the records 
required by this section at his business premises, or at such other 
place as the Attorney General may by regulation prescribe and shall 
make such records available to the Attorney General for inspection at 
all reasonable times. 
(d) 
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(1) No information or evidence obtained from records required to 
be created or maintained by this section shall, except as provided 
in this section, directly or indirectly, be used as evidence against 
any person with respect to any violation of law. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not preclude the use of 
such information or evidence in a prosecution or other action for 
a violation of this chapter or chapter 71 [18 USCS §§ 2251 et seq. 
or 1460 et seq.], or for a violation of any applicable provision of 
law with respect to the furnishing of false information. 
(el 
(1) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall cause to be af- 
fixed to every copy of any matter described in paragraph (1) of 
subsection (a) of this section, in such manner and in such form as 
the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, a statement 
describing where the records required by this section with respect 
to all images depicted in that copy of the matter may be located. 
(2) If the person to whom subsection (a) of this section applies is an 
organization the statement required by this subsection shall in- 
clude the name, title, and business address of the individual em- 
ployed by such organization responsible for maintaining the 
records required by this section. 
(f) It shall be unlawful- 
(1) for any person to whom subsection I1 (a) applies to fail to create 
or maintain the records as required by subsections (a) and (c) or 
by any regulation promulgated under this section; 
(2) for any person to whom subsection II(a) applies knowingly to 
make any false entry in or knowingly to fail to make an appropri- 
ate entry in, any record required by subsection (b) of this section 
or any regulation promulgated under this section; 
(3) for any person to whom subsection II(a) applies knowingly to fail 
to comply with the provisions of subsection (e) or any regulation 
promulgated pursuant to that subsection; and 
(4) for any person knowingly to sell or otherwise transfer, or offer for 
sale or transfer, any book, magazine, periodical, film, video, or 
other matter, produce in whole or in part with materials which 
have been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or  
which is intended for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce, 
which- 
(A) contains one or more visual depictions made after the effec- 
tive date of this subsection of actual sexually explicit conduct; 
and 
(B) is produced in whole or in part with materials which have 
been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
is shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or 
transportation in interstate or  foreign commerce; 
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which does not have &xed thereto, in a manner prescribed as set 
forth in subsection (e) (1), a statement describing where the 
records required by this section may be located, but such person 
shall have no duty to determine the accuracy of the contents of 
the statement or the records required to be kept. 
(g) The Attorney General shall issue appropriate regulations to carry out 
this section. 
(h) As used in this section- 
( I )  the tenn "sexually explicit conduct" means simulated conduct as defined 
in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (2) of section 2256 of this 
tith; 
(2) "identification document" has the meaning given that term in 
section 1028(d) of this title; 
(3) the term "poduces" means to poduce, manufacture, m publish any com- 
puter generated, digital, or other similar matter and includes the dupli- 
cation, reproduction, or reissuing of any such matter, but does 
not include mere distribution or any other activity which does not 
involve hiring, contracting for managing, or otherwise arranging 
for the participation of the performers depicted; and 
(i) Whoever violates this section shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 
years, and fined in accordance with the provisions of this title, or both. 
Whoever violates this section after having been convicted of a violation 
punishable under this section shall be imprisoned for any period of 
years not more than 10 years but not less than 2 years, and fined in 
accordance with the provisions of this title, or both. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  5 0  V i l l .  L .  R e v .  116 2 0 0 5  
